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MUELLER V ALLEN: A NEW STANDARD OF
SCRUTINY APPLIED TO TAX
DEDUCTIONS FOR
EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES
In the past thirty-seven years' the United States Supreme Court
has confronted a variety of state legislative schemes attempting to aid
sectarian schools either through a direct subsidy to the school2 or
through aid to the parents and students who patronize the schools. 3
Opponents of such legislation consistently contend that state aid to
sectarian schools offends the establishment clause of the first
amendment. 4 While holding many of these schemes unconstitutional,
the Court has validated several forms of aid to nonpublic schools.5
Unfortunately, the Court's tests for determining the constitutionality of
such legislation remain imprecise. 6
1. The Court first addressed the constitutionality of state aid to sectarian schools in Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Although the Court had applied the first amendment to the
states through the fourteenth amendment on previous occasions, see Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) (freedoms of speech, press, and religion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (freedom of religion, freedom to believe, and freedom to act), Everson was the first time
that the Court utilized the fourteenth amendment to incorporate the establishment clause, 330
U.S. at 14-15.
2. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
(reimbursement for the costs of standardized testing); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
(reimbursement for the costs of testing, diagnostic services, and textbook loans); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (reimbursement for the costs of auxiliary services, textbook loans,
and instructional materials); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472
(1973) (reimbursement for costs of testing); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (salary
supplement to teachers).
3. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(tuition tax "credit"); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans to students);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (transportation costs reimbursed).
4. The first clause of the first amendment is referred to as the establishment clause:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend.
I.
5. Examples of aid that the Court has found constitutionally permissible include
reimbursement of transportation expenses, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947), aid
for diagnostic services, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1974), reimbursement for the costs
of standardized testing, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
648 (1980), and textbook loan programs, Wolman, 433 U.S. at 238.
6. In Nyquist, Justice Powell stated that "while there has been general agreement upon the
applicable principles and upon the framework of analysis, the Court has recognized its inability to
perceive with invariable clarity the 'lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of
constitutional law."' Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761
n.5 (1973) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
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The Court has had particular difficulty formulating a precise test
for statutes granting tax relief to the parents of students attending
nonpublic schools. Although it held tax credits for tuition
unconstitutional in Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist,7 the Court specifically reserved the question whether
tax deductions for tuition would be constitutionally acceptable. 8 Not
surprisingly, after Nyquist, a conflict developed between the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth 9 and First Circuits' over the
constitutionality of virtually identical state statutes granting such
deductions.' The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Mueller v.
Allen.12
7. 413 U.S. 756, 794, 798 (1973). The New York tax benefit resembled a tax deduction, but
the Court concluded that it was similar in operation to a tax credit. See id at 789.
8. Id at 790 n.49.
9. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982) (tuition tax deduction constitutional),
af'd, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
10. Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980) (tuition tax
deduction unconstitutional).
11. The Eighth Circuit case involved a Minnesota statute that allowed the following
deduction from a taxpayer's gross income:
Tuition and transaction expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to exceed
$500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to 12,
for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary
or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wis-
consin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attend-
ance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall
mean and include books and other instructional materials and equipment used in ele-
mentary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly
taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include
instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or
worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall
it include such books or materials for, or transportation to, extracurricular activities in-
cluding sporting events, musical or dramatic events, speech activities, driver's education,
or programs of a similar nature.
MiNN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). The First Circuit case addressed a similar Rhode Island tax
statute:
Modification Reducing Federal Adjusted Gross Income - There shall be sub-
tracted from federal adjusted gross income...
(2) amounts paid to others, not to exceed five hundred ($500) dollars for each de-
pendent in kindergarten through sixth grade and seven hundred ($700) dollars for each
such dependent in grades seven through twelve inclusive, for tuition, textbooks, and
transportation of each dependent attending an elementary or secondary school situated
in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire or Maine,
wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws,
which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. As used in this section, "textbooks" shall mean and include books and other
instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in
teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary and sec-
ondary schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and materials used
in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines, or worship, the purpose of which is to incul-
cate such tenets, doctrines or worship.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980).
12. 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3064 (1983).
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Specifically, the Mueller Court held that such statutes do not
violate the establishment clause. 13 In reaching this result, the Court
utilized the traditional three-part test of constitutionality under the
establishment clause, 14 but applied a less strict standard of scrutiny
than it had applied in previous cases. This note analyzes the potential
effects of this new standard. Section one presents the Court's
traditional three-part test. Section two describes the less strict standard
of scrutiny applied in Mueller, and section three analyzes the possible
effects the new standard will have on state and federal aid to sectarian
schools.
I. THE Lemon Three-Part Test
The establishment clause of the first amendment contains broad
language: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . ... 15 The term "respecting" indicates that the drafters of
the amendment desired to prohibit not only laws that directly establish
religion, but also laws that represent a step leading to such an establish-
ment.' 6 In the absence of further guidance from the framers the task of
defining the limits of the clause has fallen on the Supreme Court.
The Court has experienced particular difficulty in determining
whether aid that benefits sectarian schools, rather than directly benefit-
ing religion itself, falls within the sweeping language of the establish-
ment clause. In Everson v. Board of Education,17 the Court addressed
this issue for the first time. Finding no standards on which to base a
decision, the Court in Everson turned to an historical analysis of the
period during which the first amendment was drafted to find the pur-
pose of the clause. 8 From this analysis, the Court reasoned that the
first amendment requires the state "to be neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers."' 9 Using this "neutral-
13. Id
14. Id at 3066.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state reimbursements of transportation expenses for children attending
religious schools).
18. Id at 8-16. The Court concluded:
[t]he "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
...[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was in-
tended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id at 15-16 (citation omitted).
19. Id at 18.
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ity" analysis, the Court determined that the law in question was neutral
and therefore that it was constitutional.20 This simplistic analysis
forced the Court to judge the constitutionality of statutes on a case-by-
case basis; it did not provide standards useful to test the constitutional-
ity of other laws. As a result, the Court developed three separate tests
in an attempt to give consistency to its interpretations of the establish-
ment clause.
The Supreme Court consolidated these three establishment clause
tests into a single three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman:21 "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.'"22 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions refined
each subtest's function; one must understand these functions to appre-
ciate Mueller's potential impact.
A. The Secular Purpose Test.
The Supreme Court utilizes the Everson neutrality analysis23 when
applying the secular purpose test.24 The test is satisfied if a court finds
a legislative purpose that neither inhibits nor advances religion.25 To
find such legislative purposes a court should examine the intention of
the legislature when it passed the law.26 Express statements of legisla-
tive purpose in a statute, though not binding on the court, are indica-
tive of legislative intent.27 The Supreme Court has also accepted
20. Id Although recognizing the possibility that the transportation program might assist
children in attending church schools and the possibility that some children might not attend the
church schools if their parents were forced to pay transportation costs, the Court compared the
transportation program to general government services such as police and fire protection. Id. at
17-18. The Court found that withdrawal of the services would detrimentally affect the church
schools, violating the first amendment's requirement that state power be exercised neutrally;
"[s]tate power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Id at 18.
Therefore, the transportation program, like other governmental services, did not violate the first
amendment even though it benefitted children attending sectarian schools.
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
22. Id at 612-13 (citations omitted).
23. For a discussion of the neutrality analysis and the holding in Everson, see supra note 20
and accompanying text.
24. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), first introduced the secular pur-
pose requirement. In that opinion, the Court cited Everson as the foundation for the test. Id at
222; see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
25. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (intention of legislature determined by language of statute).
27. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-42 (1973) ("while a legislature's declaration of
purpose may not always be a fair guide to its true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the
introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything other than a good-faith statement of pur-
pose"); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (determination that the statutes clearly state the legislative intent).
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purposes that readily can be implied from the statute28 or found in the
legislative history.29
It appears that if the Court finds any secular legislative purpose for
a statute, the statute will pass the secular purpose test.30 This tendency
has been particularly evident in cases involving statutes granting aid to
sectarian schools; purposes such as providing a fertile educational envi-
ronment,31 promoting pluralism and diversity among public and non-
public schools, 32 and enhancing the quality of secular education in all
schools 33 are acceptable legislative purposes for statutes that aid sectar-
ian schools. Put simply, the Court is reluctant to attribute unconstitu-
tional motives to state legislatures. 34 As a result, the secular purpose
test provides minimal assistance in determining whether statutes that
provide aid to sectarian schools are unconstitutional.
B. The Primary Effect Test.
In the second part of the Lemon test, the Court shifts its focus from
the legislature's intent to the statute's primary effect. Using a neutrality
analysis, this test requires a showing that the law's principal or primary
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion.35 In applying the test, the
Court has held statutes providing benefits to sectarian schools unconsti-
tutional when they further the religious mission of the schools. 36 There
are two ways a statute will be found to have this impermissible effect:
first, if its aid directly benefits a sectarian function of the school, and
second, if the aid is so substantial that it benefits the entire sectarian
enterprise.37
28. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 & n.5 (1977) (purpose implied from clause
restricting aid to nonreligious activities).
29. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363, 367-68 (1975) (purpose found in legislative
findings); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973)
(statement of legislative purpose appended to statute).
30. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984) ("[t]he Court has invalidated legisla-
tion or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it
has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious
considerations").
31. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
32. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
33. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613
(1971).
34. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983).
35. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
36. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973)
(striking down provision of New York law authorizing direct money grants from state to nonpub-
lic schools for maintenance and repair of school facilities).
37. See, e.g., id at 775-76, 783 and n.39 (Court examines statute to determine whether it aids
religious mission of an institution; a statute may be upheld if the aid to the religious aspect of
institution is immaterial and indirect).
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Statutes that provide aid to sectarian schools do not necessarily
have the impermissible effect of furthering religion.38 The Court has
acknowledged that sectarian schools have two functions-a secular
function and a sectarian function.39 Aid that is directed exclusively to
the secular function of sectarian schools is permissible because it does
not have the primary effect of furthering the religious missions of the
schools. Thus, the Court has upheld statutes that provide transporta-
tion,40 secular school books,41 and diagnostic services 42 to sectarian
schools, finding that such benefits aid secular functions. That these
types of aid would make it more likely that some students would attend
sectarian schools was not an effect that, in itself, violated the test.
43
In applying the primary effect test, however, the Court has strictly
scrutinized statutes to determine whether there is any aid that serves a
sectarian function. To pass the test, the secular function receiving the
benefit must be "identifiable and separable" from the sectarian func-
tions;44 if aid flows to a school program that has both secular and sec-
tarian characteristics it will not pass the test. For example, the Court
invalidated a state program to reimburse nonpublic schools for the
costs of giving examinations because it found a "substantial risk that
these examinations, prepared by teachers under the authority of reli-
gious institutions, will be drafted with an eye, unconsciously or other-
wise, to inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring
church." 45 An amended version of the program that limited reimburse-
ment to costs associated with state standardized testing, however, sur-
38. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670-72 (1970).
39. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968); cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-36 (1925) (sectarian schools provide adequate secular education; state interest in secular
education did not require all children to attend public schools).
40. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947). The Court has limited transportation
reimbursement to the expense of transporting a child to and from school and has invalidated
reimbursement for the costs of field trips, finding that there is no assurance that a field trip will not
further sectarian goals. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 253-54 (1977).
41. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 361-62
(1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
42. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977). In Wolman, the Court also found that
therapeutic services could be provided to sectarian school children if the services were provided at
a neutral site. The Court distinguished therapeutic services from diagnostic services, finding that a
therapist "may establish a relationship with a pupil in which there might be opportunities to trans-
mit ideological views." Id at 247. Similar services at a neutral site away from the "pervasive
atmosphere of a religious institution" were found to be permissible. Id
43. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 360 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244
(1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947). For a discussion of the holding in
Everson, see supra note 20.
44. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973).
45. Id
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vived the Court's strict scrutiny in a subsequent case. 46 In this later
case, the Court concluded that the inability of the sectarian schools to
control the test eliminated any possibility that the test would serve a
sectarian function.47
Aid that solely benefits a secular function may, nevertheless, im-
permissibly further the religious mission of a school. In Meek v. Pit-
tenger,48 for example, the Court held that state loans of instructional
materials and equipment to sectarian schools were impermissible de-
spite the non-ideological nature of the materials.49 The Court found
that the loans constituted "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function
of such schools. . .[that]. . . necessarily result[ed] in aid to the sectar-
ian school enierprise as a whole." 50 Thus, to satisfy the primary effect
requirement, aid to sectarian schools must not only be limited in focus
to the secular functions of the school, but it must also be limited in size.
Realizing that the primary effect test limited direct state aid to sec-
tarian schools to a few narrowly defined areas, states have attempted to
circumvent the test by providing aid indirectly to the schools through
benefits to parents of nonpublic school children. The Supreme Court,
however, has been reluctant to distinguish between direct and indirect
aid in its test, reasoning that such a distinction would exalt form over
substance. For example, the Court invalidated loans of educational
materials and equipment to parents, finding that the program was in
substance the same as the program found unconstitutional in Meek.5 1
Statutes providing tuition grants to parents5 2 and tax credits for
tuition53 have also been invalidated by the Court. In each of these stat-
utes the state had granted a class of citizens-the parents of children
46. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654-57 (1980).
47. Id The New York statute required the nonpublic schools to maintain complete records
of the costs incurred and provided that the State Department of Audit and Control should inspect
the records at regular intervals. Id at 659-60.
48. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
49. Id at 365-66 (materials included maps, charts and laboratory equipment).
50. Id at 366.
51. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977). The Court compared the indirect aid pro-
gram to the direct aid program in Meek and found that although there was a "technical change in
legal bailee," the equipment was substantially the same, it was used in a similar manner, and in
both programs it was stored and distributed on the school premises. Id
52. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830-33 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-89 (1973).
53. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). One of
the benefits at issue in Nyquist was in the form of a tax deduction. The Court, however, concluded
that its effect was that of a tax credit. Id at 789. The Court specifically reserved the question
whether a true tax deduction would violate the establishment clause. Id at 790 n.49.
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attending nonpublic schools-a special benefit.54 In analyzing the pri-
mary effect of these statutes the Court focused on the nature of the
benefitted class. Finding that the vast majority of nonpublic schools
were sectarian, 55 the Court concluded that the primary effect of each
statute was to benefit a class that was pervasively sectarian in nature.
5 6
Such an effect was unconstitutional because it destroyed the neutrality
required to pass the primary effect test.57
In summary, the primary effect test requires close scrutiny of any
statute that provides aid to sectarian schools or to the parents of chil-
dren attending such schools. The Court has invalidated these statutes
in three situations: if the aid benefits the sectarian function of the
schools, if it substantially aids the schools as institutions, or if it benefits
a class of citizens that is pervasively sectarian.
C. The Entanglement Test.
In contrast to the "primary effect" inquiry, the third part of the
Lemon test examines the form of the relationship between government
54. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973); see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty, 413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38, 794 (1973) ("grants to parents of private school children are given
in addition to the right that they have to send their children to public schools 'totally at staff
expense' "); see also Kosydar v. Woiman, 353 F. Supp. 744,761 (S.D. Ohio 1972) ("For the state to
allow a credit to the parent who forgoes use of the provided public facility in order to send his
child to a private school is a grant to that taxpayer of a relative economic advantage when com-
pared to taxpayers generally."), afdmem. sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
55. In Sloan, the Court accepted a lower court's finding that religious organizations con-
trolled over 90% ofnonpublic schools in Pennsylvania. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973).
Similarly, in Nyquist, the Court found that approximately 85% of New York's nonpublic schools
were church affiliated. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
768 (1973). In Kosydar, the district court found that 98% of the nonpublic schools in Ohio were
church affiliated. Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affd Mer, sub
nom Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 401 (1973).
56. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 (1973); see also Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 762 (S.D.
Ohio 1972) (as the private schools were predominantly sectarian, "it simply defies reason to say
that the statute does not aid sectarian schools"), aJ'dmem. sub nom. Grit v. Woiman, 413 U.S. 901
(1973).
57. The Court found that whether viewed as incentives to parents to send their children to
sectarian schools or as rewards for having done so, the statutes' consequences were to preserve and
support religious institutes. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973); see also Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973) (impact is the same
"[w]hether labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a subsidy"); Kosydar v. Woman, 353 F. Supp.
744, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1972) ("state may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, confer un-
restricted economic benefit upon a class of predominantly sectarian character in a manner which
tends to advantage them"), aff'dmer. sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). In Nyquist,
the Court also found that with these indirect aid statutes there was "no endeavor 'to guarantee the
separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that State financial
aid support only the former."' Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 783 (1973) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
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and religion "for the light it casts on the substance. 58 If a state statute
requires an "administrative entanglement"-governmental intrusion
into religion--or a "political entanglement"-religious intrusion into
government-the statute will fail the entanglement test.59
Administrative entanglement often results from compliance with
the requirements of the primary effect test. As shown above, the pri-
mary effect test requires that aid to sectarian schools be limited to the
secular functions of the school.60 As a result, many statutes restrict the
aid program to ensure that state aid is not flowing to sectarian func-
tions. State surveilance is often required to ensure compliance with
these statutory restrictions. 61 Surveillance, however, can be viewed as a
governmental intrusion into religion. Therefore, the Court finds an im-
permissible administrative entanglement whenever a "comprehensive,
discriminating and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be re-
quired to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed. ' 62 In other words,
the entanglement test limits aid available to sectarian schools to pro-
grams requiring minimal surveillance. 63
The entanglement test also focuses on the potential of a statute to
create political division along religious lines-a "political entangle-
ment." 64 To pass this part of the test, the divisive potential of a statute
58. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. In Lemon, the Court found that a test for administrative entan-
glement required an examination of "the character and purposes of the institutions that are bene-
fited, the nature of the aid the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority." Id at 615.
59. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) ("The hazards of churches supporting
government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of government supporting churches;
each relationship carries some involvement rather than the desired insulation and separation.");
see also Comment, Mueller v. Allen: Do Tuition Tax Deductions Violate the Establishment
Clause?, 68 IowA L. REv. 539, 554-55 (1983); Comment, Tax Deductionsfor Parents of Children
Attending Public Schools andNonpublic Schools: Mueller v. Allen, 71 Ky. L. J. 685, 690-91 (1982-
83).
60. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
61. For examples of aid programs that require state surveillance, see infra note 63.
62. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
63. Examples of aid requiring minimal surveillance are textbook loans, Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1968) (one-time test is required to determine if textbooks are secular
in nature), and diagnostic services, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977) (Court found no
need for excessive surveillance). In contrast, aid programs that have been invalidated because
they required continuing state surveillance to ensure that the benefit was not used for sectarian
purposes include teacher salary supplements, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-24 (1971),
funding of teachers providing auxiliary services, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-72 (1975),
and reimbursement of testing costs, Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413
U.S. 472, 480-81 (1973).
64. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 ("Ordinary political debate and division, however vigorous or
even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government,
but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect."); see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)
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must be minimized. The Court has considered two factors in determin-
ing the degree of political entanglement inherent in a statute: first, the
size and diversity of the benefitted class, and second, whether the stat-
ute requires continuing appropriations.65 Increasing the size and reli-
gious diversity of the benefitted class minimizes the possibility that
political divisions created by the statute will be based along religious
lines. 66 Similarly, political fragmentation can also be minimized by
eliminating any continuing appropriations requirement from a statute,
thereby avoiding the possibility of repeated political battles that accom-
pany appropriations.67 These factors, however, merely provide indica-
tions of a statute's potential for creating political division. The Court
has admitted that political entanglement decisions are "difficult to doc-
ument" 68 and that other factors such as the size and nature of the actual
controversy created by a statute might also be considered by a court.69
II. MUELLER v. ALLEN: A LESS STRICT STANDARD OF SCRUTINY
In Mueller v. Allen,70 the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Minnesota statute allowing state taxpayers to claim a deduction for ex-
penses incurred for "tuition, textbooks and transportation" in sending
dependents to elementary or secondary school.71 Although parents of
children attending sectarian schools are the primary beneficiaries of
Minnesota's statute,72 parents of children attending public schools are
(Harlan, J., concurring) (purpose of the establishment clause was to prevent the degree of political
entanglement that could strain a political system to its breaking point); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947) (establishment clause was created in response to the memory of civil strife
and political turmoil generated by competition between religious sects for political and religious
supremacy in the colonies).
65. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
66. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623; see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971);
Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 753-54 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd mere. sub nom. Grit v.
Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
67. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
68. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
69. In Nyquist, the Court suggested another factor: "Aid programs of any kind tend to be-
come entrenched, to escalate in cost, and to generate their own aggressive constituencies. And the
larger the class of recipients, the greater the pressure for accelerated increases." 413 U.S. at 797
(footnote omitted).
70. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
71. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). For the text of the statute, see supra note 11.
72. Approximately 820,000 students attended the Minnesota public schools during the 1982-
83 school year. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3064. The Minnesota Department of Education estimated
that monies received by public school districts that are characterized as tuition-i.e., fees which
may be charged to pupils for services and materials pursuant to MINN. STAT. §§ 120.06, 123.39,
and 120.74--totalled $2,005,142, an average of $2.49 per public school student. Brief for Petition-
ers at 8-9, Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). Few public school students, however, actually
are charged tuition in the ordinary sense. Although no statistics are cited for the most recent
school years, in the 1978-79 school year only 79 pupils paid tuition in Minnesota, and in the 1977-
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also eligible for aid under the statute.73 The Minnesota statute thus
neutrally extends benefits to any parent who incurs deductible ex-
penses.74 The apparent advantage to nonpublic school parents results
from a separate decision by the state to provide free schools, textbooks
and transportation to children attending public schools,75 thereby elim-
inating the possibility, in most cases, that the parent of a child attend-
ing public school will incur deductible expenses.
The Court structured its opinion in Mueller in the form of the
traditional Lemon three-part test.76 However, the Court applied a dif-
ferent level of scrutiny to the Minnesota tax statute than it previously
78 school year only 40 students were charged. Joint App. at 35, Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062
(1983).
During the 1979-80 school year almost 91,000 students attended non-public schools in Min-
nesota; 95% of those students attended schools that consider themselves to be sectarian. Mueller,
103 S. Ct. at 3064-65. From these statistics it seems clear that the bulk of the Minnesota tax
deduction benefit is extended to the parents of children attending nonpublic schools, the vast
majority of which are sectarian in character.
73. The tuition tax deduction is available to the parents of public school children who are
required to pay tuition. In Minnesota, public school students are required to pay tuition if they
attend public schools outside the school district of their residence, MINN. STAT. § 123.39(5) (1982),
and in a number of other situations. SeeMueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (D. Minn. 1981)
(district court findings of fact concerning scope of Minnesota tuition deduction).
Similarly, the transportation deduction provides a benefit to the parents of some public
school students. The district court in Mueller found that deductible transportation expenses in-
cluded the cost of transporting students who live in one district but attend school in another, the
cost of transporting students in school districts that do not provide free transportation (free trans-
portation to public schools in Minnesota is provided only at the option of the local school board,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 123.39(1) (West Supp. 1984)), and the cost of transporting students who do
not qualify for free transportation because of their proximity to school. Mueller, 514 F. Supp. 998,
1000 (1981). In addition, the Minnesota Department of Revenue has ruled that the cost of a
required field trip is also a deductible transportation expense. Joint App. at 19, Mueller v. Allen,
103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). Thus, in the above situations, parents of public school students incur
expenses and receive tax deductions under the Minnesota statute.
The textbook deduction also benefits the parents of public school children because it applies
not only to the costs of secular textbooks (textbooks in Minnesota are provided free to public
school students, MINN. STAT. § 123.35(2) (1982)), but also to other necessary expenses such as the
cost of tennis shoes and sweat suits for physical education; rental fees paid to the school for cam-
eras, ice skates, calculators, and musical instruments; the cost of supplies necessary in shop and
home economics courses; and the cost of pencils and notebooks for class. Mueller, 514 F. Supp. at
1000.
74. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3065 (1983).
75. The general policy of the state of Minnesota in providing free public school education is
stated in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.72 (West Supp. 1984). Local school boards are required to
furnish free textbooks to public school students, MINN. STAT. § 123.35(2) (1982), and they have an
option to provide free transportation if funds are available in the district. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 123.39(l) (West Supp. 1984).
76. One author has suggested that the three-part test often "serves more as a framework for
structuring opinions than as a guidepost for determining outcome." Young, Constitutional Validity
of State Aid to Pupils in Church-Related Schools-Internal Tension Between the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 788 (1977).
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had applied when utilizing the Lemon test. Apparently, the Court rea-
soned that the benefit conferred upon religious institutions by the tax
deduction was of such an attenuated nature that a milder standard of
scrutiny was appropriate.77 This new standard of scrutiny actually af-
fects only two parts of the Lemon test; the secular purpose test remains
unaffected because the standard of scrutiny required in that test was
already low. 78 The effects on the other two parts of the Lemon test will
be examined separately.
A. The Primary Effect Test in Mueller.
The level of scrutiny required under the primary effect test for stat-
utes allowing tax deductions for tuition was the major issue presented
by the conflict in the circuit courts that necessitated Supreme Court
review in Mueller.79 In Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Nor-
berg,80 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit con-
fronted a Rhode Island statute virtually identical to the Minnesota
statute at issue in Mueller.8' Applying the strict level of scrutiny re-
quired by the traditional primary effect test,82 the court looked beyond
77. The dividing line between the new mild standard of scrutiny and the traditional strict
standard of scrutiny might appear to be arbitrarily drawn. In a parallel situation, however, the
Court drew a similar line between aid to primary and secondary schools, which remains subject to
a traditional level of scrutiny, and aid to higher education, which is subject to a milder standard.
In determining the constitutionality of state aid to colleges and universities, the Court has empha-
sized the character of the institutions, rather than the form of aid supplied. See Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764 (1976). The Court found the following differences between
college and pre-college education: "College students are less susceptible to religious indoctrina-
tion; college courses tend to entail an internal discipline that inherently limits the opportunities for
sectarian influence; and a high degree of academic freedom tends to prevail at the college level."
Id at 750; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) ("The skepticism of the college student is
not an inconsiderable barrier to any attempt or tendancy to subvert the Congressional objectives
and limitations."); see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1973). In essence, the Court decided
to limit the strict scrutiny requirements of the Lemon test to institutions that had a strong sectarian
influence. Thus, the Court drew a line between college and pre-college aid, calling the form of aid
irrelevant and placing the burden on the party opposing college aid to show that the benefitted
institutions were "pervasively sectarian." See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 750-53, 759-60.
In Mueller, the Court emphasized the form of the challenged aid rather than the character of
the institution benefitted. As in the college aid cases, the Court drew a line, this time between tax
deductions and other forms of aid. In drawing this line, the Court recognized that at a certain
point the benefits provided to religion became so attenuated that the strict scrutiny required by the
traditional Lemon test was inappropriate. It is important to note that in Mueller the tax deduction
was neutrally available to all, making an analysis of the character of the benefitted institutions
unnecessary. Thus, as in the college aid cases, the party opposing a tax deduction should bear the
burden of proving that the benefitted class is pervasively sectarian.
78. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
80. 630 F.2d 855 (Ist Cir. 1980).
81. See supra note 11 (texts of the two state tax deduction statutes).
82. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
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the facial neutrality of the statute. It used statistical analysis to con-
clude that "the Rhode Island tax deduction would confer a tax benefit
along nearly solid sectarian lines."' 83 In essence, the court used a de
facto analysis84 to determine the character of the affected class of bene-
ficiaries under the statute. Concluding that the majority of the de facto
beneficiaries were parents of sectarian students, the court found the
similarities to Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist85 inescapable and therefore held the Rhode Island statute
unconstitutional.
In Mueller v. Allen, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reached a contrary result with facts and statistics almost identical to
those in Norberg.86 That court based its decision on a finding that the
statute was facially neutral,87 thereby implicitly accepting the defend-
ant's argument that "a de jure, not a de facto, analysis is the proper test
in ascertaining the breadth of the benefitted class."88
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court stressed
the statute's broad language that made the tax deduction for educa-
tional expenses available to all parents.8 9 The Court also rejected the
petitioner's statistical analysis of the de facto class of beneficiaries:
"We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a
facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which vari-
ous classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law."90 Be-
cause the tax deduction was available to all parents, the Court
83. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 860. In comparing the Rhode Island tax statute to the tax exemp-
tion upheld in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and the tax "credit" program held
unconstitutional in Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), the Norberg court held:
[T]he district court's finding that the overwhelming majority of the parents eligible for
the tuition tax deduction send their children to sectarian schools denies the tuition de-
duction the protection of Walz and places it ... within the proscription of Nyquist.
Absent a class having primarily secular characteristics . . it cannot be said that the
advantages flowing from the statute to the parents of sectarian school students will be
incidental to secular ends and effects.
Norberg, 630 F.2d at 861 (citation ommitted).
84. For a discussion of de facto and de jure analyses, see infra note 88.
85. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
86. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1200-01 (8th Cir. 1982). The court recognized the simi-
larities to Norberg but disagreed with the Norberg court's analysis of prior Supreme Court cases.
Id at 1201.
87. See id at 1204.
88. Id at 1199. A "de facto" analysis requires a factual inquiry into the character of the class
of citizens actually benefitted by a statute. A "de jure" analysis requires only scrutiny of the
statute itself to determine the character of the class of citizens eligible for the benefit. See Com-
ment, Mueller v. Allen: Do Tuition Tax Deductions Violate the Establishment Clause4 68 IoWA L.
REv. 539, 549 (1983).
89. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3068.
90. Id at 3070.
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compared the Minnesota statute to similarly broad statutes upheld in
earlier opinions9' and distinguished decisions that held other types of
tax benefits unconstitutional. 92
The Court identified two features of the Minnesota tax deduction
that justified the less strict level of scrutiny inherent in a de jure analy-
sis: first, the benefit conferred on religion by the granting of a tax de-
duction to individual citizens is highly attenuated, 93 and second, this
attenuated benefit to religion is subject to the private choices of individ-
ual parents.94 The Court then considered these features when analyz-
ing the purposes of the establishment clause, and concluded that "the
historic purposes of the clause simply do not encompass the sort of at-
tenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices
of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from
the neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case."'95
Thus, in Mueller, the Court applied the primary effect test in a
fundamentally different way. Rather than scrutinizing a statute for its
de facto effect, the Court apparently was willing to presume a secular
effect when it determined from a de jure analysis that a broad class of
citizens were eligible for the benefit. The Court's justifications for
utilizing a de jure analysis,96 however, suggest that this less strict stan-
dard of scrutiny should be applied only to a narrow range of statutes-
those statutes that benefit religion in a highly attenuated manner.
91. See id at 3070 & n.10; see also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (approv-
ing loans of secular educational materials to allstudents); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
16 (1947) (approving statute reimbursing al/parents for school transportation costs).
92. See id at 3068 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 794 (1973) (tax "credit" for parents of children attending nonpublic schools violates primary
effect test)); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 518 (3d Cir. 1979) (tax deduc-
tion for parents of children attending nonpublic schools violates primary effect test), affd mem.,
442 U.S. 907 (1979); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (tax credit for par-
ents of children attending nonpublic schools violates primary effect test), affdmem. sub nora., Grit
v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
93. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069. But f Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790-91 (1973) (tax credit has same effect as a tuition grant because it en-
courages and rewards parents for sending a child to a nonpublic school); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353
F. Supp. 744, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (tax credit aids religion if it allows parents to send their
children to nonpublic schools that they could not otherwise have afforded), aff'dmem sub nora.
Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
94. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069. The Court could have concluded that the availability of the
tax deduction to all parents would create a demand for a variety of nonpublic schools. Thus,
looking beyond the present class of de facto beneficiaries under the Minnesota statute, the Court
might have envisioned the existence in the future of a broad class of de facto beneficiaries without
substantial sectarian characteristics.
95. Id
96. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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B. The Entanglement Test as Applied in Mueller.
The mild standard of scrutiny applied in the primary effect test
was paralleled by the minimal scrutiny applied in Mueller to the entan-
glement test. This less strict scrutiny was not clearly evident in the
Court's application of the administrative entanglement test because
even under a traditional level of scrutiny, a tax deduction creates no
major administrative entanglement problem.97 Even so, the Court's
analysis in this part of the test was noticeably brief;98 although the
Court did address the administrative entanglement problems inherent
in the Minnesota textbook deduction, it neglected to address the possi-
ble entanglement problems related to deductions for instructional
materials and equipment that are included in the textbook deduction.99
This cursory examination suggests that the Court was applying a less
strict standard of scrutiny.
In addition to reducing the level of scrutiny required under an ad-
ministrative entanglement analysis, the Court further weakened the en-
tanglement test by eliminating the political entanglement test entirely
for statutes that provide aid indirectly. The Court concluded from an
examination of the cases distinguished in Lemon1°° that the political
entanglement test is "confined to cases where direct financial subsidies
are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools." 101
While a line between indirect and direct aid may appear arbitrary, it
97. The possibility of administrative entanglement is lessened considerably because a tax
deduction directly benefits parents rather than schools. Therefore, any state surveillance would be
directed not at the school, but at the parent, substantially lessening the risk that the government
would intrude into religious affairs. This argument is based on an assumption that the state would
have to monitor only the parents' tax deductions. In reality, however, textbook and tuition ex-
penses originate in decisions made at the school, and, therefore, any state surveillance of a parent's
tax deductions will necessarily require an analysis of the decisions made by the school. Thus,
under examination, this argument does not hold up. Under the Court's rather limited scrutiny in
Mueller, it would seem that so long as there is no readily apparent entanglement, the statute under
consideration will pass the administrative entanglement test.
98. The Court's analysis was contained in a single paragraph. See Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at
3071.
99. The Court concluded that the Minnesota textbook deduction was similar to textbook
loans upheld in previous opinions. Id (citing three cases). Before Mueller, the Court had not
addressed the possible entanglement created by statutes providing instructional materials and
equipment because such statutes had never passed the primary effect test. Cf. Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229,250 (1977) (aid provided held to have primary effect of providing direct and substan-
tial advancement of the sectarian enterprise); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975) (same).
The Minnesota textbook deduction clearly included such items. See supra note 73.
100. The political entanglement test originated in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23.
101. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3071 n.l1. The Court reaffirmed this view in Lynch v. Donnelly,
104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364-65 (1984) ("This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored
schools or colleges, or other religious institutions, and, hence, no inquiry into potential political
divisiveness is even called for.").
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seems consistent with the Court's earlier conclusions that the nature of
the benefit to religion was attenuated and that the class of beneficiaries
was broad. These conclusions allow a presumption that the tax statute
will not have a divisive political effect.102
Thus, the Mueller Court's entanglement analysis significantly dif-
fered from the traditional entanglement test. The standard of scrutiny
under an administrative entanglement test was lowered to require only
a superficial examination. Moreover, the political entanglement test
was eliminated for statutes providing indirect aid to sectarian schools.
These changes parallel similar changes made in the primary effect test,
and would appear to be the result of the Court's conclusion that a tax
deduction to parents merely results in an attenuated benefit to religion.
III. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MUELLER
The less strict standard of scrutiny applied in Mueller suggests that
any tax deduction for educational expenses that neutrally extends its
benefits to all parents 03 will survive a constitutional attack based on
the establishment clause. The majority opinion indicates that a tax de-
duction benefitting the parents of sectarian school students will be sub-
ject to a de jure effect test rather than the traditional de facto effect
test. 104 Under this de jure analysis, the Court no longer requires a stat-
utory benefit to be limited strictly to the secular functions of the
schools. For example, the Minnesota statute in Mueller allowed deduc-
tions for the transportation expenses of school field trips and deduc-
102. Under the traditional entanglement analysis, when no further legislation is needed to
continue the benefit and when the benefitted class is broad, the possibility of political entangle-
ment is considerably less. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67. Nevertheless, pressure to
increase or decrease the existing tax benefit could develop conflicts based on religious affiliation.
See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797 (1973); Kosydar
v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 766-67 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aft'dmem sub nom Grit v. Wolman, 413
U.S. 901 (1973). Apparently, the Court's introduction of an additional factor-the attenuated
nature of the tax benefit-neutralized this political entanglement argument.
103. It is, however, unclear when the Court will find the required neutrality. In Mueller, the
parents of public school children were eligible for tax deductions under the Minnesota statute in
certain situations. See supra note 73. A different situation might be presented if a statute purports
to benefit all parents, but, in fact, the statute excludes parents of public school children because
they never incur deductible expenses. For example, a tuition tax deduction to all parents who pay
tuition to any school would appear on its face to be neutral, but if the state provides free public
schools without exceptions-in contrast to Minnesota-then the parents of public school children
could never be eligible for the deduction. To find that such a statute was not neutral the Court
would not be forced to look at statistics showing the type of persons receiving benefits, but instead
simply could review the applicable state statutes to determine if the parents of public school chil-
dren could ever be eligible. Thus, it is possible that the Court may distinguish Mueller from cases
similar to the above example.
104. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
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tions for the costs of certain instructional materials.10 5 In earlier cases,
these categories of aid had been invalidated based on findings that the
aid was not restricted to purely secular functions.'0 6 Thus, the limita-
tions placed on direct aid to sectarian schools confining the aid to secu-
lar functions of the schools 0 7 would not appear to apply to statutes
providing aid to schools through the indirect method of tax deductions
to parents.
Perhaps, however, the Court will place certain limitations on de-
ductible expenses. Charges to parents for purely sectarian activities
would certainly be ineligible for a deduction, but so long as the ex-
penses incurred relate to the normal functions of a school it seems clear
that the Court will not require a strict analysis of whether a particular
funded activity might be used to inculcate religious beliefs.1
0 8
This approach may be based on an assumption by the Court that
the amount of actual tax saving to each parent will always be less than
the expense required per pupil to fund the secular functions of the
school. Under this view, it would be impossible for a tax deduction to
benefit the sectarian functions of the school. In Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the Court rejected this the-
ory in relation to a tax credit. It reasoned that "a mere statistical judg-
ment will not suffice as a guarantee that state funds will not be used to
finance religious education."' 1 9 The nature of a tax deduction, how-
ever, may allow a different result. As Justice Marshall acknowledged
in his Mueller dissent:
The deduction at issue in this case does differ from the tax bene-
fits in Nyquist and our other prior cases in one respect: by its very
nature the deduction embodies an inherent limit on the extent to
which a state may subsidize religious education. Unlike a tax credit,
which may wholly subsidize the cost of religious education, if the size
of the credit is sufficiently large, or a tax deduction of an arbitrary
sum, a deduction of tuition payments from adjusted gross income
can never "provide a basis for. . . complete subsidization of. . .reli-
gious schools."10
105. See supra note 73.
106. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250, 253-54 (1977) (instructional materials and equip-
ment loaned to children or parents and reimbursement to nonpublic schools for the costs of field
trips violate the primary effect test because they do not separate aid to secular functions and aid to
sectarian functions); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363-66 (1975) (loans of instructional materi-
als and equipment to nonpublic schools violate the primary effect test).
107. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
109. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 778 (1973).
110. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3075 n.5 (Marshall, I., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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This distinction would allow the Court to avoid an analysis of the pos-
sible benefits flowing to sectarian functions.
Therefore, in its Mueller decision, the Court has provided the
states with a simple and efficient, though indirect, method for achieving
their apparent goal of supporting nonpublic schools. Rather than pro-
viding a variety of programs to fund selected secular functions of non-
public schools, a state now may achieve the same goal-support of
sectarian schools-by providing a single program of tax deductions.
Furthermore, Mueller indicates that the types of functions that can be
subsidized utilizing tax deductions will not necessarily be limited to
purely secular functions. Apparently, in some cases, the state may do
indirectly that which it cannot do directly.
The Mueller decision also opens the door for indirect federal aid to
nonpublic schools in the form of tax deductions. The existence of two
recent bills calling for federal tax credits to parents of children attend-
ing private schools' 1 makes it clear that there is an interest in provid-
ing federal aid to nonpublic schools. Because Mueller provides a
format for a tax deduction likely to pass constitutional scrutiny, the
Court's opinion may encourage congressional legislation drafted to
conform with the Minnesota statute.112
IV. CONCLUSION
In Mueller v. Allen, the United States Supreme Court held that a
specific type of state aid to non-public schools was constitutionally per-
missible. In holding that the statute at issue did not violate the estab-
lishment clause, the Court applied the Lemon three-part test in a
substantially different way, minimizing the level of scrutiny required
under both the primary effect test and the entanglement test. The case,
however, does not reject the former standard of scrutiny required in the
Lemon test. Instead the case illustrates how a Lemon analysis changes
when it reaches certain limits. The college aid cases suggest that be-
yond a certain point the sectarian character of an institution becomes
so overshadowed by its secular character that a strict Lemon analysis
no longer seems appropriate." 3 At that point, a less strict test has been
applied by the Court. In Mueller, the Court has revealed another ex-
44
111. S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REc. 1335-38 (1983); S. 550, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
127 CONG. REc. 1514-16 (1981).
112. A federal tax deduction extended to all parents who incur educational expenses would
appear facially neutral. The Court, however, might distinguish Mueller based on a finding that in
certain states the parents of public schoolchildren could never be eligible for the benefit. See supra
note 103.
113. Seesupra note 77.
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ception to the strict Lemon standard. Rather than analyzing the nature
of the institution, this exception is based on the nature of the benefit-
when the benefit to religion becomes highly attenuated a strict Lemon
analysis is no longer necessary.
The approach by the Court is a realistic one. In modem society,
the risk of establishing religion through limited aid to religious schools
is small. By establishing boundaries for a strict Lemon analysis, the
Court recognized the absurdity of blindly adhering to a strict test when
the risks of establishing religion have become minimal. Defining the
limits of the strict Lemon test entails an arbitrary line-drawing process,
but the line drawn between tax deductions and other forms of aid is
sensible.
John W Connoll, III
